In general, a gateway-oriented password-based authenticated key exchange (GPAKE) protocol allows a client to establish an authenticated session key with a gateway via the help of an authentication server, where the client has pre-shared a password with the server. In 2013, Chien-Wu-Yeh proposed a new GPAKE protocol and then proved its security in an enhanced model. Chien et al. claimed that their proposed GPAKE protocol can secure against off-line password guessing attacks. However, this paper points out that Chien et al.'s GPAKE protocol is still vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks by any other user unlike their claims.
Introduction
In 2005, Abdalla et al. [1] first proposed a gateway-oriented password-based authenticated key exchange (GPAKE) protocol among a client, a gateway, and an authentication server, where a password was only shared between the client and the authentication server. And then Abdalla et al. [2] and Byun et al. [3] had respectively proposed their improvements to enhance the security.
In 2013, Chien et al. [4] pointed out that all the improved schemes [2, 3] fail to commit the security requirements and then proposed a new GPAKE protocol to enhance the security.
Nevertheless, this paper points out that Chien et al.'s GPAKE protocol is still vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks by any other user [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We subsequently review Chien et al.'s GPAKE protocol in Section 2. The off-line password guessing attacks on Chien et al.'s GPAKE protocol are presented in Section 3. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 4.
Review of Chien et al.'s GPAKE Protocol
This section briefly review Chien et al.'s GPAKE protocol [4] .
Notations
We outlined some notations used in this research paper.
• C, G, S: the client, the gateway, and the authentication server, respectively.
• pw: the password shared between C and S.
• K GS : the secret key shared between G and S.
• MAC k (·): the message authentication code using a secret key k, where
• (G 1 , p, q): a sub-group with order q in Z * p .
• ≡ p : the mod p operation.
• x ∈ Z * q : randomly choosing an element x of Z * q .
• f (·), h 1 (·), h 2 (·): three secure one-way hash functions, where
Chien et al.'s GPAKE protocol
Chien et al.'s GPAKE protocol [4] consisted of a client C, a gateway G, and an authentication server S. The client and the server have pre-shared a password pw, and the channel between the gateway and the server is assumed to be authenticated and private. Its security is based on the Computational DiffieHellman problem. The details of the protocol are described as follows, where the mod p operation is omitted when the semantic is clear and sid denotes the session identifier that can uniquely identify the current session from others. In practice, the sid can be taken to be the partial transcript of the conversation between the communicating entities. It is assumed that a secret key K GS is shared between G and S. (
C sends the request including its identity to the gateway G.
G forwards C's request along with its identity to the server S.
Based on the client's identity, S retrieves the password pw, randomly chooses an integer z, and then computes
S sends Z to G.
G randomly chooses an integer y, computes
and sends it with (sid, C, G, Z) to C.
Upon receiving the data (sid, C, G, Z, Y ) from G, C first retrieves the value g z , randomly chooses an integer x, and computes 
where sk CS is the ephemeral key between C and S, and sk CG , sk CG are the ephemeral keys between C and G. sk CS will be used as the final session key after authentication. C then computes
where M1 will be used as a authentication token to the server, and M2 will be used as a authentication token to the gateway. It finally sends the data (sid, X, M1, M2) to G.
After receiving the data from C, G first computes
and verifies whether
If the authentication succeeds, then G temporarily believes that it and C have the same keys sk CG and sk CG . G then sends the data (sid, X, M1, Y, h 1 (Y, K GS )) to S.
After receiving the data from G, S computes
and checks whether
If the verification succeeds, then S has authenticated C, and it further checks whether h 1 (Y, K GS ) is valid. If so, it S computes
Depending on the verification, S sends either success, M3 or f ailure. If the response is success, G accepts the session key sk CG .
(8) G → C : sid, (success, M3, M4)orf ailure
If the gateway receives success from S, it sends the data in step 8 to C.
(9) After receiving the data from G, C checks whether
If the verification succeeds, C also checks whether
If the verification succeeds, it ensures the client that it shares the same value sk CG with the gateway, and C and G finally accept the key sk CG . Finally, both C and G could use the common session key sk CG in upcoming private communication. 
Cryptanalysis of Chien et al.'s GPAKE Protocol

Off-line password guessing attacks
The off-line password guessing attack scenario is outlined in Fig. 2 . A malicious gateway G (including any client) without helping a legal server S can perform the following off-line password guessing attack.
C → G : (sid, C)
G → C : (sid, C, G, Z , Y )
Let G be a malicious gateway mediating between C and S. Without any help of S, G randomly chooses an integer y, computes Compute sk *
sid, C −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Choose y ∈ R Z * q Compute Y ≡ p g y Let Z = g sid,
C, G, Z , Y ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Figure 2: Off-line password guessing attack
Finally, G sends (sid, C, G, Z , Y ) to C.
C → G : (sid, X, M1, M2)
Upon receiving the data (sid, C, G, Z , Y ) from G, C first will retrieve the value g z by computing
Then C randomly will choose an integer x, and compute
We can see the sk CS is equal to
and M1 is equal to
C finally will send the data (sid, X, M1, M2) to G.
When G receives (sid, X, M1, M2), G guesses a password pw * and computes
G then checks if
If the check passes, then G confirms that the guessed password pw * is the correct one.
5. If it is not correct, G chooses another password pw * * and repeatedly performs above step (4) until
where
Real applications for the proposed off-line password guessing attacks
In the modern life which the Internet has strong influence to people, passwords are the most common means of user authentication on the Internet. For practical applications, password-based authentication protocols are required when making use of Internet network services like E-learning, on-line polls, on-line ticket-order systems, roll call systems, on-line games, etc. Suppose that the password pw of user C can be revealed by the attacker due to the above described password guessing attacks. In real applications, users offer the same password as above to access several application servers for their convenience. Thus, an attacker may try to use the guessed password pw to impersonate the user C to login to other systems that the user C has registered with outside this Chien et al.'s GPAKE protocol-based server [9, 10] . If the targeted outside server adopts the normal authentication protocol, it is possible that the attacker can successfully impersonate the user C to login to it by using the guessed password pw. Therefore, the password breach cannot be revealed by the attacker's actions.
Conclusions
This paper demonstrated that Chien et al.'s GPAKE protocol still falls prey to off-line password guessing attacks by any other user. For this reason, Chien et al.'s GPAKE protocol is insecure for practical application. It is important that security engineers should be made aware of this, if they are responsible for the design and development of gateway-oriented password-based authenticated key exchange systems.
